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How our Belief in Qualia Evolved, and 
Why We Care so much
A Reply to David H. Baßler
Daniel C. Dennett
David Baßler’s  commentary identifies  five unasked questions in my work,  and
provides excellent answers to them. His explanation of the gradual evolution of
higher-order intentionality via a Bayesian account leads to an explanation of the
persistence of our deluded belief in qualia. 
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David Baßler’s commentary is a model of con-
structive criticism, not only pointing to weak-
nesses  but  offering  persuasive  repairs.  I  have
just two points of minor correction to offer be-
fore turning to my understanding of his inter-
esting  proposals  for  extensions  to  my  view,
which I am inclined to adopt. 
First,  then, the quibbles.  I  am happy to
see him endorsing my frequent tactic of asking
not how to explain x but rather asking how to
explain why we believe in  x  in the first place,
but I think that this is a procrustean bed on
which to stretch my concept of intentional sys-
tems. In  Dennett (1971) I was indeed offering
an account of intentionality that was demoting,
in that intentionality was not seen as a feature
that sundered the universe into the mental and
physical (as Brentano and others had claimed),
but I don’t like to think of it as dismissing in-
tentionality as  a  real  phenomenon—though of
course  many  have  interpreted  me  that  way.
Dennett (1991)  tried  to  correct  that  miscon-
strual,  showing that  the  phenomena of  inten-
tionality are real in their own way—any beings
that don’t  discover these patterns are missing
something important in the world. That aside, I
Dennett, D. C. (2015). How our Belief in Qualia Evolved, and Why We Care so much - A Reply to David H. Baßler.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 10(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570665 1 | 5
www.open-mind.net
love the use he makes of Hume on miracles to
introduce  his  treatment  of  our  minds  as  wit-
nesses, just not very good witnesses; their testi-
mony  can  be  explained  in  ways  that  do  not
grant the truth of some of their most cherished
claims. As he puts it, the assumption of phe-
nomenal consciousness “is deeply misleading be-
cause  it  makes  us  look for  the wrong things,
namely,  the objects  our judgments are about,
rather  than  the  causes  of  these  judgments,
which  are  nothing  like  these  objects”  (Baßler
this collection, p. 2).
My  other  quibble  is  a  similar  elision  I
want to resist. He says: “Large parts of Break-
ing the Spell  are dedicated to making under-
standable  how  ‘belief  in  belief’  could  have
evolved over the centuries,  beginning long be-
fore the appearance of any religion” (Baßler this
collection, p. 4). This misidentifies higher order
belief, beliefs about beliefs, with belief in belief.
The former did indeed evolve gradually over the
eons, and I find Baßler’s “just so story” about
this  gradual  process  enticing  indeed,  and will
have more to say about it below, but belief in
belief  is  a  much  younger  (and  almost  always
pernicious)  phenomenon,  which  involves  the
deeply confused judgment that it is morally ob-
ligatory to try to get yourself to believe tradi-
tional nonsense when you know better. “If you
don’t believe in God, you are immoral. There-
fore you must strive to believe in God. Belief in
God is a good thing to inculcate in our children
and in ourselves.” Belief in belief didn’t arrive
on  the  human  scene  until  the  proto-religions
(which originally had no need for the concept)
hit upon this obligation as a way of protecting
their hegemony against the lures of competing
dogmas. Some proto-religions were blithely ecu-
menical, adopting the gods and demons of their
neighbors’  creeds  as  just  another  bit  of  lore
about  the  big  wide  world,  but  this  credulity
could not long stand in the face of market com-
petition and growing common knowledge about
the  objective  world.  Since  many—probably
most—people in the world now see through at
least most of the nonsense, their persistent be-
lief in belief is now a deplorable anachronism, a
systematic  source  of  hypocrisy.  (A  delightful
cartoon in a recent New Yorker perfectly cap-
tures this folly. Two armies confront each other,
flying  identical  banners;  one  mounted warrior
says  “There  can  be  no  peace  until  they  re-
nounce their Rabbit God and accept our Duck
God.”)
As I say, these are quibbles I have to get
off my chest. Now to Baßler’s substantive pro-
posals.  He  organizes  his  commentary  around
five questions he says I haven’t properly asked,
and he has answers to all of them. He’s right
that these are gaps in my account. (1) Why do
we need to monitor our dispositions? (2) How is
self-monitoring accomplished? (3) How did this
self-monitoring evolve in a gradual  fashion? (4)
Why  do  we  misidentify  our  dispositions?  (5)
Why are we so attached to the idea of qualia? 
His answers are constructed by taking on,
for the sake of argument, my Intentional Sys-
tems Theory, and he gets it right, in all regards.
Intentional Systems Theory (IST) presupposes,
tactically, that any entity treated as an inten-
tional system “is optimally designed to achieve
certain goals. If there are divergences from the
optimal path, one can, in a lot of cases, correct
for this by introducing abstract entities or false
beliefs.” IST is, as I  say, a competence model
that  leaves  implementation  or  performance
questions unaddressed.1
Then  comes  Baßler’s  major  novelty:  the
idea  of  an  intermediate  competence  between
mere  first-order  intentional  systems—which
have no beliefs about beliefs (their own or oth-
ers’)—and  full-fledged  second-or-higher-order
intentional systems—which can iterate the be-
lief context. Such entities he calls (what else?)
1.5th order intentional systems (shades of David
Marr’s  1982 two-and-a-half-D sketch!). This is
proposed to answer his first and second ques-
tions with a plausible and in principle testable
evolutionary  hypothesis.  A  system  with  only
1.5th order intentionality “is able to ascribe de-
sires  only  in  a  very  particular  and  concrete
1 In this regard it is strikingly similar to the free energy principle as
presented by  Hohwy (this collection); both use the assumption of
biofunctional optimizing as an interpretive lever to make sense of the
myriad complexities of  the brain,  assigning to the brain a funda-
mental task of acquiring accurate anticipations of the relevant causes
in the organism’s world. I have not yet been able to assess the costs
and benefits of these two different ways of thinking of brains as fu-
ture-producer:  both are  abstract,  both court  triviality  if  misused.
This is a good topic for future work.
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manner, i.e., actions that the object in question
wants to perform with certain particular exist-
ing objects, that the system itself [the ascriber]
knows about” (Baßler this collection, p. 6). He
is wise to choose basic desires (for food, mating
opportunities, safety, . .  .  ) as the intentional
states ascribed in this precursor mentality, since
they are so readily “observable” in the immedi-
ate behavior of the object, giving our pioneer
mind-reader a quick confirmation that  it’s  on
the  right  track,  a  small,  gradual  step  for  a
Bayesian brain. 
Now what selection pressures would favor
such systems evolving gradually from mere first-
order systems? To the primitive first-order sys-
tems, “the behavior of their conspecifics is un-
explained noise to them.” But then they make
some  simple  discoveries.  When  they  see  an
apple tree,  they approach it,  and so do their
conspecifics. If they see a predator, they run, as
do their kin. “One might indeed say that the
desires  of  the  agents  are  projected  onto  the
world”, Baßler says. Then, in a very substantive
footnote that I wish were in the text—his foot-
notes contain much of value, and should not be
passed over!—he adds: “What I mean by ‘pro-
ject’ is that instead of positing an inner repres-
entation . . . . whose function is a desire, along
with correct beliefs about the current situation,
what is posited is an eat-provocative property
of the apple itself. Both theoretical strategies al-
low for the prediction of the same behavior. The
crucial difference is that attributing new prop-
erties  to  objects  that  are already part  of  the
model is a simpler way of extending the model
than  positing  a  complex  system  of  internal
states to each agent” (Baßler this collection, p.
7, footnote 9). This answers question (3).
He  then  imagines,  plausibly,  that  these
1.5th-order systems will evolve a system of com-
munication, but this (as I and others have ar-
gued)  necessarily  involves  hiding  information
from others, which involves having an internal
cache  of  self-monitored  knowledge  one  can
choose to divulge or not, depending on circum-
stances. And this in turn—Baßler’s next major
innovation—leads  them  to  become  “Agents
[who] believe in the existence of a special kind
of properties: they believe that they approach
apples because they are sweet, cuddle babies be-
cause they are cute, laugh about jokes because
they are funny.” This primitive concept of caus-
ation serves them well, of course, and is just the
sort  of  simplification  to expect  in  a Bayesian
brain, answering question (4).
Now for the icing on the cake, Baßler’s an-
swer to question (5) about why we care about
qualia. As he notes, “It is not obvious why we
do not react as disinterestedly to their denial as
we did to the revelation that there is no ether”
(Baßler this collection, p. 5). Here is his explan-
ation:  science  comes  along  and  starts  to  dis-
mantle the handy manifest image, with all its
Gibsonian affordances, and for those creatures
capable of understanding science, a new prob-
lem arises: something is being taken away from
them! All those delectable properties (and the
abhorrent properties as well, of course). Philo-
sophers “still see that there is something miss-
ing, and since cuteness is not a property of the
outside world, they conclude that it must be a
property of the agents themselves” (Baßler this
collection,  p.  8).  “We have the zombic hunch
because it seems to us that there is something
missing and it seems so because our generative
models are built on the assumption that there
are properties of things out there in the world
to  which  systems  like  us  react  in  certain
ways. . . . We dismiss robots because we know
they can only react to measurable  properties,
which do not seem to us to be the direct cause
of our behavior” (ibid.).
This rings true to me, and I hadn’t seen
this way of accounting for the persistence of the
zombic hunch. Baßler proposes that “the reason
we, intuitively, do not accept a robot as a sub-
ject like ourselves is because we know how the
robot does it; we know that it calculates, maybe
even in a PP manner–we know that it does not
react directly to the properties that seem to ex-
ist and that seem to count” (this collection, p.
9). He goes on to list five further features his
account provides for.  The properties  we delu-
sionally persist in “projecting” as qualia are (1)
“‘given directly’ to a person”, (2) “irreducible
to  physical,  mechanical  phenomena”,  (3)
“atomic, unstructured”, (4) “important to our
lives/beings  as  humans/persons”,  and  (5)
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“known to every living human being; it is not
possible  to  sincerely  deny  their  existence”
(Baßler this collection, p. 9). I particularly like
the way that his account explains why (4) is a
feature: “These properties seem to be the causes
of all our behavior: if one did not feel the pain-
fulness of a pain, one would not scream; if one
did not sense the funniness of a joke, one would
not laugh, etc. Since the model is still needed
for  interacting with others,  despite  theoretical
advances in the sciences this felt importance of
qualia to our lives is very difficult to overcome”
(Baßler this collection, p. 9).
I  see  that  my response  consists  in  large
measure of approving quotations from Baßler’s
commentary! But that is as it must be; I want
to confirm in detail and acknowledge the nice
way his proposals dovetail with my account, ex-
panding it into new territory, and helping me
see what I have so far only dimly appreciated:
just how valuable the new Bayesian insights are.
But let me end with a friendly amendment
of my own. Baßler’s interpretation of my view is
at one point a simplification, probably just for
gracefulness  of  exposition,  and perhaps meant
itself as a friendly amendment, but I want to is-
sue a caveat. Baßler takes me to be saying that,
for such properties as cuteness and color, “we
misidentify  dispositions  of  the  organism  with
properties of another object” (this collection, p.
3) and goes on to have me holding that “This
means, under a personal level description, that
we believe that there are properties independent
of the observer, such as the cuteness of babies,
the sweetness of apples, or the blueness of the
sky” (ibid., p. 4). I want to put this slightly dif-
ferently. It is not that there is nothing objective
about babies that makes them cute (or of the
sky that makes it blue) but just that these ob-
jective,  observer-independent  properties  are
themselves curiously dispositional: they are, as
he  notes  at  one  point,  what  I  have  called
“lovely”  properties.  They can only  be  defined
relative to a target species of observers, such as
normally  sighted—not  “color-blind”—human
beings,  as  contrasted with tetrachromats such
as pigeons, for instance. But their existence as
properties is trivially objective and observer-in-
dependent.  Thus  rubies  were  red before  color
vision evolved on this planet in the sense that if
a time machine could take normal human be-
ings back to the early earth, they would find ru-
bies  to  be  red.  And  some  strata  exposed  by
primordial  earthquake faults  would  have been
visible, to some kinds of eyes and not to others.
Probably  dinosaur babies  were cute,  since,  as
John Horner (1998)  has  argued,  evidence
strongly  suggests  that  they  were  altricial,  re-
quiring  considerable  parental  attention,  and
having the foreshortened skull and facial struc-
ture of prototypically cute juvenile animals, in-
cluding birds. The science-endorsed properties,
both external and internal, are so hugely differ-
ent from what the manifest image makes them
out to be, that it is a pickwickian stretch to say
that science has discovered “what cuteness is”
or “what color is,” but it is also deeply mislead-
ing to say that science has discovered that noth-
ing is cute,  or colored, after all.  And so in a
similar vein, I have to contend with how to oc-
cupy the awkward middle ground between deny-
ing that there are qualia at all, or saying that
qualia are something real, but something utterly
unlike what most people  think (and philosoph-
ers say) qualia are. 
1 Conclusion
Baßler  has  provided  me with a plausible  and
testable  extension  of  my  Intentional  System
Theory with his innovation of a 1.5th-order in-
tentional system, showing in outline how higher-
order  intentional  systems  might  evolve  from
their more primitive ancestors. And he has also
shown  new  ways  of  explaining  a  point  that
many  people  just  cannot  get  their  heads
around. As my former student Ivan Fox (1989)
once put it, “Thrown into a causal gap, a quale
will simply fall through it.” See also Fox’s essay,
“Our Knowledge of the Internal World” (1994)
and  my commentary on it (1994), which I dis-
covered, on rereading just now, to be groping
towards  some  of  the  points  in  Baßler’s  com-
mentary. I challenged Ivan Fox to “push further
into the engineering and not just revel in the
specs” (Dennett 1994, p. 510), and Baßler has
done just that.
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